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NOTES
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES - REMEDIES OF CREDITORS AND
PURCHASERS - ATTACHMENT. - The law of fraudulent conveyances
has always been complex and difficult, bristling with unresolved
problems. Not least among these has been the question of when an
attachment is authorized in tort cases against the property of one
who makes a fraudulent conveyance. The issue presented is well
illustrated by the case of Republic of Italy v. De Angelis,1 in which
a parthership composed of De Angelis and his wife owned a pack-
ing plant and leased it to the De Angelis Packing Company, Inc., a
closed corporation of which De Angelis was also the chief stock-
holder. De Angelis then acquired a controlling interest in another
meat-packing concern, Adolf Gobel, Inc., a clause of the sale con-
tract providing that the partnership of which De Angelis was a
member would cancel the lease to the plant to De Angelis Packing
Company, Inc., thus automatically putting it out of business. The
plaintiff, whom the De Angelis Packing Company, Inc., had agreed
to supply with a large amount of tallow, was left upon the cancel-
lation of the lease and subsequent dissolution of the corporation
holding contracts executed by a non-existing firm .2 It sued De
Angelis, his wife, and their partnership in tort for inducing a breach
of contract, obtained an attachment of individual and partnership
property on the ground that defendants had tortiously induced the
breach of contract by cancelling the lease and had assigned, dis-
posed of, or secreted its property with intent to defraud its
creditors.
3
The defendants moved to vacate the attachment, arguing that
actual intent to defraud had not been shown and was necessary to
a valid attachment under New York's Civil Procedure Act.4 It was
held, however, that the plaintiff's attachment was valid under the
provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, adopted in
New York,5 which requires only a showing of constructive intent to
defraud to authorize an attachment.
Previous New York cases had held that under the Act a fraudulent
conveyance could be set aside by a bill in equity.6 This case would
1. 206 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1953).
2. The effect of these rather complicated transactions, so far as the plaintiff was
concerned, was a net loss of approximately $800,000.
3. N.Y. Debtor and Crediior Law J§273, 275, 277, 278 (1) (b).
4. §903, subd. 3.
5. N.Y. Debtor and Creditor Law, §§270-281.
6. Sabatino v. Cannizzaro, 243 App. Div. 20, 275 N.Y.S. 677 (1934); Brody v.
Pecoraro, 250 N.Y. 56, 164 N.E. 741 (1928).
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appear to be the first adjudication construing the direct attachment
provision of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act as permitting
an attachment independent of the general statute regulating the
remedy.-
But the general problem has a long and troublesome history.
The practice of a debtor placing property beyond the reach of
creditors is an old one. The most famous early law dealing with the
problem was the Statute of 13 Elizabeth,3 which provided that
every conveyance made to the end, purpose and intent to delay,
hinder or defraud creditors and others of their just and lawful
actions would be void. At common law, in jurisdictions that did not
have statutes such as this, only those creditors whose claims were in
existence at the time a conveyance was made could attack it.' Not
until the advent of statutes like the English Statute, which included
the words "and others," did the courts bring subsequent creditors
within the rule."o
Fraudulent transfers have always defied exact description or
definition because of three characteristics: (1) the absence of any
well recognized, definite conception of insolvency, (2) failure to
make clear the persons legally injured by a given fraudulent con-
veyance, (3) the attempt to make the Statute of Elizabeth cover
all conveyances which wrong creditors, even though the actual
intent to defraud does not exist."11 The essence of a fraudulent con-
veyance is the diminution of the debtor's assets, so that the creditor
has less property against which he can proceed for the satisfaction
of his claim.12 In general, a conveyance made by a debtor who is
insolvent, or who thereby is rendered insolvent, is prima facie
fraudulent.13
The classic decision which set the first standards of what con-
stitutes fraudulent intent was Twyne's Case,1 4 decided in 1601. It
held a secret transfer of sheep with retention of title in the vendor
was fraudulent. The court said for such a transfer to be valid it
must be based on good consideration and bona fide. Bona fides
7. N.Y. Debtor and Creditor Law §278, gives a creditor with a mature claim the
following options: (a) Have the conveyance set aside or the obligation annulled to the
extent necessary to satisfy his claim, or (b) Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy
execution upon the property conveyed.
8. 13 Elizabeth c. 5(1570).
9. Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio 469 (1842).
10. 1 Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences, §317 (rev. ed. 1940).
11. 9A U.L.A. 43 (1951).
12. Lynch v. La Fonte, 371 F. Supp. 499, 503 (S.D. Calif. 1941).
13. Nicholson v. Scott, 50 F. Supp. 209, 212 (E.D. Mich. 1934).
14. 30 Coke 806, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601).
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require openness of dealing rather than secrecy, transfer in specific
satisfaction of a particular debt, and immediate delivery of pos-
session. 5
A person is insolvent for the purposes of the Uniform Act, when
the present fair salable value of his assets is less than the amount of
his liability on his existing debts as they fall due.16 Fair consider-
ation or payment for a transfer of property requires reasonable
proportion between what is given and what is received, and may in-
clude the satisfaction of an antecedent debt.1 7 In general, if the
conveyance renders the debtor insolvent and there was inadequate
consideration, the conveyance is fraudulent.' s Persons about to
engage in a new business 9 or incur new debts -' for which their
remaining assets are insufficient, can be shown to have made a
fraudulent transfer.
Actual intent to place property beyond the reach of justified claims
where it can be proved, is clearly fraudulent, both as to present and
future creditors.21 Many courts say that certain types of transactions
amount to "badges of fraud" and give rise to a presumption of lack
15. Id. at 814, 76 Eng. Rep. at 817.
16. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, §2(1), 9A U.L.A. 53 (1951); N.D. Rev.
Code §13-0203 (1943) "1. A person is insolvent when the present fair salable value of his
assets is less :than the amount that will be required to pay his probable liability on his
existing debts as they become absolute and matured"; See Carter v. Carter, 130 P.2d
186 (Cal. App. 1942).
17. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, §3, 9A U.L.A. 57 (1951); N.D. Rev.
Code §13-0203 (1943) "Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation: 1. When
in exchange for such property or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor, and in good
faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied; or 2. When such prop-
erty or obligation is received in good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt
in amount not disproportionately small as compared with the value of the property or ob-
ligation obtained." See Nicholson v. Scott, 50 F. Supp. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1943).
18. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, §4, 9A U.L.A. 73 (1951); N.D. Rev. Code
§13-0204 (1943) "Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a person
who is or thereby will be rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard
to his actual intent if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair
consideration." See Bowery v. Vines, 178 Tenn. 98, 156 S.W.2d 395 (1941).
19. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, §5, 9A U.L.A. 90 (1951); N.D. Rev. Code
§13-0205 (1943) "Every conveyance made without fair consideration when zhe person
making it is engaged or is about to engage in a business or transaction for which the
property remaining in his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital, is
fraudulent as to creditors and as to other persons who become creditors during the con-
tinuance of such business or transaction without regard to his actual intent." See Kearny
Plumbing Supply, 151 Atl. 873 (N.J. Ch. 1930).
20. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, §6, 9A U.L.A. 92 (1951); N.D. Rev. Code
§13-0206 (1943) "Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred without 'air
consideration when the person making the conveyance or entering into the obligation In-
tends or believes that he will incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature, is!
fraudulent as to both present and future creditors." See McBride v. Bertsch 58 F.2d
797 (W.D. Mich. 1930).
21. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, §7, 9A U.L.A. 93 (1951); N.D. Rev. Code
§13-0207 (1943) "Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual "n-
tent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either
present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors." See
Henderson v. Kendrick, 72 Minn. 253, 75 N.W. 127 (1898); see also 3 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence, 879 (5th ed. 1943).
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of good faith.2 2 Two of these "badges" have resulted in statutory
enactments in many jurisdictions: The retention of possession of
goods by insolvent debtors who have secretly conveyed them away
so often defrauded creditors that they brought on the enactment of
recording acts, and bulk sales acts were passed to regulate the en-
tire sale of goods in stock to one buyer.
2
3
Conveyances of partnership property which result in partnership
insolvency are fraudulent if made to a partner or to an outsider if
made without fair consideration.24 The Uniform Act definitely pro-
vides against the necessity that a claim be liquidated. Proceedings
can be brought prior to judgment. 25 Creditors with mature claims,
except as against bona fide purchasers for value without notice and
their assignees, have an option. They may either (a) have the
fraudulent conveyance set aside in equity,26 or (b) disregard it and
attach or levy execution. 27
The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act was approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, in
22. Burkhalter v. Glennville Bank, 184 Ga. 147, 190 S.E. 644 (1937); Schreiber
Milling and Grain Co. v. Nutrena Mills, 149 Kan. 276, 87 P.2d 577 (1939); Farrell v.
Paulus, 309 Mich. 441, 15 N.W.2d 700 (1944); Bentley v. Caille, 289 Mich. 174, 286
N.W. 163 (1939); Hendrix v. Goldman, 92 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Mo. 1936).
fictitious consideration, false statements as to consideration, transactions different from
usual course of doing business, transfer of all of a debtor's property, insolvency, confi-
dential relationship of the parties, and transfers in anticipation of suit or execution, and
though none of these things alone proves fraud, they warrant inference of fraud, especially
where there is a concurrence of a number of them."
23. 1 Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences, §305 (rev. ed. 1940).
24. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, §8, 9A U.L.A. 121 (1951); N.D. Rev. Code
§13-0208 (1943) "Every conveyance of partnership property and every partnership
obligation incurred when the partnership is or thereby will be rendered insolvent, is
fraudulent as to partnership creditors, if the conveyance is made or obligation is incurred:
1. To a partner, whether with or without a promise by him to pay partnership debts;
or 2. To a person not a partner without fair consideration to the partnership as distin-
guished from consideration to the individual partners." See Liebowitz v. Arrow Roofing
Co., 259 N.Y. 391, 182 N.E. 58 (1932). The plaintiff in the De Angelis case claimed
that this section was violated, in that partnership assets were used to reduce De Angelis'
personal obligation to a bank. The court agreed and the attachment on the partnership
property was allowed to remain in force, pending outcome of the suit.
25. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, §10, 9A U.L.A. 141 (1951); N.D. Rev.
Code §13-0210 (1943) "Where a conveyance made or obligation incurred is fraudulent
as to a creditor whose claim has not matured, he may proceed in the district court against
any person against whom he could have proceeded had his claim matured, and the court
may: 1. Restrain the defendant from disposing of his property; 2. Appoint a receiver to
take charge of the property; 3. Set aside the conveyance or annul the obligation; or 4.
Make any order which the circumstances of the case may require."
26. Zakbeim v. Dry Harbor Homes, 245 App. Div. 769, 281 N.Y.S. 153 (1935); An-
derson v. Stribling, 160 Tenn. 453, 26 S.W.2d 131 (1930).
27. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, §9, 9A U.L.A. 122 (1951); N.D. Rev. Code
§ 13-0209 (1943) "Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, 6uch
creditor, when his claim has matured, as against any person except a purchaser for 'air
consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase or one who has
derived title immediately or mediately from such a purchaser, may: 1. Have the convey-
ance set aside or obligation annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim; or 2.
Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution upon the property conveyed. A
purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent has given less than a fair consideration
for the conveyance or obligation may retain the property or obligation as security for repay-
ment."
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1918.28 It represented an attempt to codify and modernize the
Statute of Elizabeth.29 To date twenty states have adopted the
Uniform Act. 30 When North Dakota revised their Code in 1943,
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act was included.31 The
Statute spelled out what was already part of our existing law. 32 The
Code Revision Committee said in a prefatory note to Chapter 13-02:
"S.S. 1939, c.110, the Recodification Act, requires the Code Revision
Commission to make the statutory law conform to the declaratory
law, and the Commission feels that because of this provision of the
1939 Act, it should recommend the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act for adoption to include in the Code various rules which
have been established by judicial decisions.."
33
In addition to Chapter 13-02, which enacted all but the last three
sections of the Uniform Act, Chapter 13-0134 also deals with fraud-
ulent conveyances. It was allowed to remain in the Code, although
13-02 in effect repealed this former section. To avoid confusion,
Chapter 13-01 should probably be formally repealed.
Before the Uniform Act, the general rule was that tort claimants
were denied any remedies," without first obtaining a judgment.36
Some authority 37 can be cited to show that the Act can be used to
set aside a fraudulent conveyance, before judgment, in tort cases.
The theory here advanced is that a tort claimant is a creditor whose
claim has not matured.38 The court in the De Angelis decision has
now allowed a remedy to a tort claimant, as a matured creditor. 39
A tort claimant in New York can thus disregard a fraudulent con-
veyance and attach the property conveyed, previous to judgment.
It could be argued that this will result in property being unjustifi-
ably attached on frivolous tort claims. But in such cases the courts
should move quickly to dissolve the attachment where the plaintiff
cannot establish a prima facie case.
28. 9A U.L.A. 42 (1951).
29. Kline v. Inland Rubber Corp., 194 Md. 122, 69 A.2d 774 (1949).
30. 9A U.L.A. 42 (1951).
31. N.D. Rev. Code c. 13-02 (1943).
32. Walker v. Connell, 63 N.D. 622, 249 N.W. 726 (1933).
33. See notes of Code Revision Commissioners, to c. 13-02 of the North Dakota
Revised Code (1943).
34. H§13-0101 to 13-0113, N.D. Rev. Code (1943).
35. Sonnesyn v. Akin, 12 N.D. 227, 97 N.W. 557 (1903). But many jurisdictions
allowed attachment in cases where the defendant was a non-resident. See Moen v. Melvin,
57 N.D. 630, 223 N.W. 702 (1929). See also 2 So. Calif. L. Rev. 480 (1929).
36. 1 Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences, 81 (rev. ed. 1940).
37. See Underwood et al. v. Krotman et al., 193 Misc. 309, 84 N.Y.S. 2d 431 (1948);
Babcock v. Tam, 156 F. 2d 116 (9th Cir. 1946).
38. See note 25 supra.
39. See note 27 supra.
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The De Angelis case is of special interest because of the dissent.41
Judge Chase agreed that a prima facie case had been made, show-
ing that the partnership had tortiously induced the breach of con-
tract by the corporation. But he did not believe attachment should
be permitted under the facts of the case. The view of the dissent
was that, assuming a fraudulent conveyance could be attacked by
attachment under the Act, such proceedings would still have to be
brought under the provisions of the New York Civil Procedure Act,
Section 903, on attachment remedies.41 This would in effect give
the right under the Act, but compel the litigant to get his remedy
from without the Uniform Act. This view seems to possess the dis-
advantages that the creditor would then be forced to pursue his
remedy without the benefit of the well defined presumptions as to
intent outlined in the Act. He would thus be required to prove
"actual" intent to defraud his creditors, before he could avail him-
self of the remedy of attachment. The general rule is that mere
constructive fraud does not ordinarily warrant an attachment, 2
and proving actual fraudulent intent to justify an attachment can at
times be very difficult.
43
The De Angelis case interprets New York Statutes which are very
similar to those of North Dakota. 4" If New York had followed the
dissent in the case, the Uniform Act would have found a fraudulent
conveyance, but then, the claimant would have had to resort to the
attachment statute in order to bring the property under the juris-
diction of the court. This would have brought the law back to the
dilemma of whether or not the intent of the conveyor justified at-
tachment. In view of the unfortunate consequences which would
40. See 206 F. 2d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion).
41. N.Y.C.P.A. §903 requires in order to warrant attachment, in §3 that "If a natural
person or domestic corporation, has removed or is about to remove property from the state
with intent to defraud his or its creditors, or has assigned, disposed of or secreted, or is
about to assign, dispose of . . ." The intent required is that of actual intent. See
Casola v. Vasquez, 147 N.Y. 258, 41 N.E. 517 (1895).
42. Page v. Steinke, 60 N.D. 685, 236 N.W. 261 (1931); Millang v. Lambros, 90
Misc. 638, 153 N.Y.S. 944 (1915); Harris v. Spencer, 130 Minn. 141, 153 N.W. 125
(1915).
43. 38 Yale L. J. 822 (1929).
44. Both states have the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. The Court held there
was a fraudulent conveyance and that an attachment could be sustained by using the
following statutes in this order: N.Y. Debtor and Creditor Laws, §§273, 275, 277, and
278. North Dakota has identical statutes: §§13-0204, 13-0206, 13-0208 and 13-0209,
N.D. Rev. Code (1943). T~Ae New York Attachment statute, N.Y.C.P.A. 903 (note 41
supra), is basically the same as North Dakota §32-0801, N.D. Rev. Code (1943).
North Dakota also requires "actual" intent under this law, as shown in Gamble-Robinson
Minot Co. v.' Mauratis, 55 N.D. 616, 214 N.W. 913 (1927).
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follow adoption of the dissent, it is to be hoped that North Dakota
will follow the rule of this case.45  GORDON THOMPSON.
NEGLIGENCE - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE - THE DOCTRINE OF
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. - There is a pronounced trend in this
country today toward the adoption of damage apportionment or
"comparative negligence" acts. In 1951, for instance, legislation to
that effect was introduced in sixteen states.' The reason for the
present trend probably lies in the great post-war increase in auto-
mobile accidents, the litigation arising therefrom, and the corres-
ponding need for aiding the uncompensated victims. In view of the
growing prominence of the doctrine of comparative negligence, it
seems desirable that any discussion of it should include at least
some background, by way of a brief treatment of the doctrine of
contributory negligence, its modifications and the beginnings of
comparative negligence-followed by a judicial and legislative
history of the doctrine of comparative negligence, as well as a dis-
cussion of some of the problems it entails.
Contributory Negligence
The doctrine of contributory negligence was born with the Eng-
lish case of Butterfield v. Forester.2 Plaintiff, riding away from the
public tavern at a furious pace, failed to observe a pole the defend-
ant had left lying across the road and rode into it. He was subse-
quently disallowed recovery for his injuries on the theory that he
had contributed to his own harm by failing to use common and
ordinary caution.
In 1824 the doctrine was accepted in America. 3 It has operated,
essentially, to preclude a plaintiff from recovery where his act
contributed as an efficient or "proximate" cause to his own injury.4
45. Care must be used in the preparation of the pleadings, in order to bring the action
within the provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. In the case of Irwin
v. Meese, 325 Mich. 344, 38 N.W.2d 867 (1949), an equitable action was brought to
enjoin the transfer of assets, previous to the adjudication of a tort claim. Plaintiff's
counsel evidently overlooked the Uniform Act in the theory of the case, for the Act, in
effect in Michigan at the time, was not pleaded. The Supreme Court of Michigan re-
fused to enjoin the transfer, although it was perfectly obvious that if the Uniform Act
had been pleaded, the transfer would have been ruled a fraudulent conveyance.
1. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 1 n.1, citing Lipscomb,
Comparatice Negligence, 344 Ins. L.J. 667. The sixteen states are: Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah and Washington.
2. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
3. Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. 621 (1824).
4. Cleveland By. Co. v. Halterman, 22 Ohio App. 234, 153 N.E. 922 (1926);
MeLeod v. City of Spokane, 26 Wash. 346, 67 Pac. 74 (1901).
